Raising Canadian Living Standards:  
A Framework for Analysis

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Executive Summary

Canada’s living standards have been falling relative to those in the United States in recent years. The Chairman and CEO of the TD Bank Financial Group, Charles Baillie (2001) has suggested that Canadians adopt as a societal goal not only the reversal of this downward trend, but that Canadian living standards exceed US living standards within 15 years. Policies that the public and private sectors might adopt to attain this very ambitious objective were the focus at the multi-stakeholder roundtable organized for October 7-8, 2002.

The objective of this background paper is to provide a framework for analysis and discussion of the issue of raising Canadian living standards. The paper first discusses definitions of living standards and related concepts. It then examines trends of living standards historically in Canada and the United States and in OECD countries. The third section looks at the relative importance of the determinants of living standards – productivity, working time, demographic structures, labour force participation, and the unemployment rate – in the growth of living standards in Canada and in accounting for the income gap with the United States and other countries. The fourth section discusses what strategies need to be pursued in terms of the five determinants of living standards growth for Canada to exceed US living standards by 2016.

The key conclusions of the paper are twofold. First, a focus on improving Canada’s productivity growth performance, and in particular, eliminating the Canada-US productivity gap, is by far the most important and effective way to attain the objective of Canadian living standards exceeding US living standards by 2016. Second, an objective for Canada of matching or exceeding the US productivity level is probably a better societal objective than equaling or exceeding US living standards, as measured by GDP per capita. Attaining this objective would certainly give Canadians the opportunity to have the same level of per capita income as Americans, but it would also give Canadians the option of choosing more leisure time, a component of economic well-being that is currently not incorporated into GDP.

The key findings of this study are:

- Productivity has been by far the main driver of increased living standards in Canada, accounting for over 100 per cent of real GDP growth over the 1946-2001 period, 76 per cent over the 1973-2001 period, and again, over 100 per cent over the 1989-2001 period. Increased labour force participation and a relatively larger working age population have also contributed to living standards growth in the postwar period,
while declining working time and higher unemployment have reduced living standards.

- Canada’s GDP per capita in 2001 was 84.7 per cent of the US level. Of this 15.3 percentage point income gap, 18.0 points was due to Canada’s lower productivity level, 2.2 points to higher unemployment, and 1.1 points to the lower participation rate. The higher proportion of the population of working age in Canada reduced the income gap by 5.1 points, while longer hours worked in Canada further reduced the gap by 0.5 points.

- Canada has suffered a relative deterioration in its living standards in the postwar period. In 1950, Canada’s GDP per capita ranked fourth in the OECD area, after Switzerland, the United States, and New Zealand. By 2001, Canada had dropped to sixth, being overtaken by Denmark, Norway and Ireland and still behind Switzerland and the United States.

- There is only limited potential for Canada to decrease the income gap with the United States by reducing unemployment, and increasing labour force participation and working time. If Canada were to achieve US levels in these variables, the overall Canada-US GDP per capita gap would be reduced by only 3.3 points or 21 per cent.

- The most politically acceptable and effective policy to eliminate the Canada-US income gap by 2016 is to reduce the Canada-US productivity gap of 18.0 percentage points. This would require output per hour growth in Canada of 1.2 percentage points faster per year than in the United States for a 15-year period. While an extremely ambitious objective, such a productivity growth differential is not unprecedented in Canada, as it was an even greater 1.6 points per year over the 1949-64 period.

- While public policies and private sector initiatives can contribute to faster productivity growth in Canada, the key factor that will determine whether Canada could achieve fast enough productivity growth to overtake US productivity levels by 2016 will be the evolution of productivity in the United States. If the current wave of productivity-augmenting technological innovation in the United States comes to an end, decreasing US productivity growth, and if Canada can use these innovations to play technological catch up, there may be the possibility of attaining US productivity levels, a feat never achieved in Canada’s economic history.
Raising Canadian Living Standards: A Framework for Analysis

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Definition of Living Standards

The general definition of living standards is the material basis of everyday life. While complex measures of living standards have been developed, real income has become the standard proxy used to quantify levels and trends in living standards. However, economists recognize that income measures do not capture a number of variables affecting economic well-being, most importantly leisure time, but also the state of the environment, equality, and security.
The Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS) has developed the Index of Economic Well-being to provide a much broader measure of trends in economic well-being than income measures provide. The Index is based on trends in consumption, broadly defined: stocks of wealth, including human capital and the degradation of the environment; inequality and poverty; and economic insecurity, including the income risks facing the unemployed, persons with health problems, single parents, and the elderly. 3

This paper, however, will not focus on economic well-being. Rather it will focus on the narrower concept of living standards, as proxied by income, with one important exception. Differences in the amount of non-working time or leisure will be discussed in the context of living standards comparisons across countries. This is because there is wide agreement that the quantity of leisure time can be considered a component of a broad definition of living standards.

Three definitions of aggregate income can be used in the analysis of trends in living standards: GDP per capita, personal income (PI) per capita, and personal disposable income (PDI) per capita. GDP per capita is the most widely used income measure of living standards, particularly for international comparisons. It includes factor incomes from all sources as well as depreciation or capital consumption allowances. This measure of living standards will be the main measure used in the paper.

Personal income is defined as that income that accrues to individuals or households, including labour income, investment income (excluding capital gains), and government transfer payments to persons. It excludes undistributed corporate profits and depreciation. Personal disposable income or after-tax personal income is defined as personal income minus direct taxes (income and payroll taxes).

Some argue that trends in per capita personal disposable income provide a better indicator of trends in living standards than trends in per capita personal income because disposable income represents the individual’s direct command over resources. Others argue that the benefits provided to society financed by tax revenues must also be factored into measures of living standards and from this perspective trends in disposable income are not necessarily superior to trends in personal income as a measure of the true trends in living standards.

Trends in Canadian Living Standards

Discussion of Canada’s living standards focuses on both the level of living standards relative to other countries, with particular emphasis on the United States, and trends in living standards within Canada, and relative to other countries.

Canada-US Comparisons of Living Standards Levels in 2001

In 2001, GDP per capita in Canada, expressed in current dollars 4 at a purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate of $0.85 as estimated by Statistics Canada (2002a), was
$29,870 US. GDP per capita in the United States was $35,264 US. Thus Canadian GDP per capita in 2001 was 84.7 per cent of that in the United States, an income gap of 15.3 percentage points.  

Personal income (PI) per capita in Canada in 2001 was $23,865 in current US dollars, compared to $30,378 in the United States, giving a Canada-US ratio of 78.6 per cent or an income gap of 21.4 percentage points. The larger gap relative to GDP per capita reflects the lower ratio of personal income to GDP in Canada than in the United States. 

Personal disposable income (PDI) per capita in Canada was $18,211 in 2001 in current US dollars, compared to $25,859 in the United States. Canada PDI per capita was thus 70.4 per cent of that of the United States, an income gap of 29.6 percentage points. The higher share of direct taxes in personal income in Canada relative to the United States (23.7 per cent of PI versus 14.9 per cent) accounts for this greater Canada-US income gap for PDI than for PI. It is important to note that the nearly 30 points income gap between Canadian and US living standards implied by the PDI data is misleading. It assumes that Canadians do not receive any additional benefits from the additional 8.8 percentage points of PI they turn over to the government as taxes relative to their American counterparts. To the degree that higher taxes in Canada reflect the public’s trade-off, as mediated through the political process, regarding the provision of public goods and services relative to private goods and services, PI represents a much better indicator of living standards than PDI.

Which of the three aggregate income measures outlined above represents the most appropriate measure for the debate on Canadian living standards? I would argue GDP per capita is the most appropriate because it provides the best proxy of the potential present and future consumption possibilities of the population. This is because it includes corporate profits, which can be distributed to individuals as dividends or reinvested to increase future consumption.  

**Trends in Canada-US Levels of GDP Per Capita**

There have been two major trends in Canada’s GDP per capita relative to that in the United States in the postwar period from 1946 to 2001, namely, an improvement from 1946 to 1981, followed by a deterioration from 1981 to the late 1990s (Table 1 and Chart 1). 

In 1946, Canada’s GDP per capita, expressed in current US dollars at PPP exchange rates, was 71.6 per cent of the US level. Over the next three and one half decades the ratio increased, reaching a peak of 90.7 in 1975, declining slightly, but rebounding and nearly achieving its peak level again in 1981 at 90.6 per cent. The rise was particularly rapid in the first half of the 1970s (from 80.9 per cent in 1969 to 90.7 in 1975). After 1981, the ratio began to fall, bottoming out at 81.1 per cent in 1997, with the lion’s share of the decline concentrated in the 1988–92 period (from 87.4 per cent in 1988
to 81.2 per cent in 1992). Since 1997, there has been an upward trend in Canada’s relative GDP per capita, reaching 84.7 per cent of the US level by 2001.

Two periods were thus crucial for the evolution of Canada’s GDP per capita relative to that in the United States in the postwar period. During the boom of the first half of the 1970s (1969-1974), our relative income position improved remarkably, by 10 percentage points. During the recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s (1988-92), our relative position fell significantly, by 6 percentage points, a deterioration that has since not been reversed.

Trends in Canada-US Rates of Growth of GDP Per Capita

Trends in Canada’s level of GDP per capita relative to that in the United States are determined by the relative growth rates of GDP per capita in the two countries. Tables 2 for Canada and 3 for the United States and Chart 1 show these growth rates, in real terms, for a number of cyclically neutral periods.

Both Canada and the United States experienced a fall-off in the growth in living standards, as proxied by real GDP per capita after 1973 (Table 2). In the 1946-73 period in Canada, real GDP per capita increased at a 2.68 per cent average annual rate. This rate of advance fell almost one percentage point to an average annual 1.76 per cent in the 1973-2001 period. After 1973, the rate of growth progressively fell in successive cyclically neutral peak-to-peak periods, from 2.22 per cent per year in 1973-81 to 1.85 per cent in 1981-89 to 1.40 per cent in 1989-2001. However, the average growth rate for the 1990s is misleading as it masks extremely low GDP per capita growth in the first half of the decade (0.24 per cent per year from 1989 to 1995) and the very robust growth of the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s (2.57 per cent from 1995 to 2001).

In the 1946-73 period in the United States, real GDP per capita rose at a 2.24 per cent average annual rate, falling only 0.42 percentage points to 1.82 per cent in the 1973-2001 period. Real GDP per capita growth was particularly weak in the 1973-81 period at 1.45 per cent per year (Table 3). It picked up to a strong 2.52 per cent in the 1981-89 period, and then fell off to 1.60 per cent in the 1989-2001 period. As in Canada, real GDP per capita growth was much weaker in the first half of the 1990s (1.02 per cent from 1989 to 1995) than in the second half (2.18 per cent from 1995 to 2001).

Over the 1946-2001 period, real GDP per capita growth in Canada exceeded by 0.18 percentage points per year (2.21 per cent versus 2.03 per cent) that in the United States. This led to a 13.1 percentage point increase in Canada’s GDP per capita, as a proportion (expressed in current dollars) of that in the United States from 71.6 per cent in 1946 to 84.7 per cent in 2001 (Table 1).

In the 1946-73 period, Canada’s real GDP per capita growth outpaced that in the United States by 0.44 percentage points (2.68 per cent versus 2.24 per cent), raising the relative income ratio to 85.2 per cent. After 1973, real GDP per capita growth in Canada lagged that in the United States (1.76 per cent versus 1.82 per cent), decreasing Canada’s
GDP per capita relative to the US level and increasing the Canada-US income gap. Canada’s growth in real GDP per capita compared to that in the United States was particularly poor in the 1980s (1.85 per cent per year in 1981-89 versus 2.52 per cent). It was also somewhat lower in the 1990s (1.40 per cent per year in 1989-2001 versus 1.60 per cent in the United States). The gap between Canadian and American performance was particularly stark in the first half of the 1990s, with real GDP per capita advancing only 0.24 per cent per year in Canada versus 1.02 per cent in the United States from 1989 to 1995. In contrast, in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, real GDP per capita growth in Canada slightly exceeded that in the United States (2.57 per cent versus 2.18 per cent from 1995 to 2001).

Trends in Canada GDP Per Capita Relative to OECD Countries

Data compiled by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands for 22 OECD countries show that in 2001 Canada ranked sixth in terms of GDP per capita in the OECD area with 77.9 per cent of the US level (Table 4). Norway (84.0 per cent of the US level), Ireland (82.1 per cent), Switzerland (81.9 per cent), and Denmark (80.7 per cent), and, of course, the United States had higher levels of GDP per capita than Canada.13

Canada has suffered a relative deterioration in its living standards in the postwar period. In 1950, Canada’s relative GDP per capita at 81.9 per cent of the US level ranked fourth in the OECD area, after Switzerland, the United States, and New Zealand. By 1973, Canada’s GDP per capita at 87.3 per cent again ranked fourth, with West Germany replacing New Zealand. By 1989, Canada, with GDP per capita 87.5 per cent of the US level still ranked fourth. By 1995, Canada had dropped to sixth at 81.6 per cent, being overtaken by Denmark and Norway. By 2001, Canada was overtaken by Ireland at 77.9 per cent.

These trends in relative GDP per capita of course reflect the relative growth rates of GDP per capita in the different OECD countries (Table 5). Over the 1950-2001 period Canada had the third lowest rate of growth in real GDP per capita in OECD countries. Only New Zealand and Switzerland fared worse.

Determinants of Living Standards

GDP per capita is determined by five factors, namely:

- the amount of output, expressed in constant prices, produced by each worker per hour;
- the average annual number of hours the worker works;
- the proportion of the total population who are of working age as only persons of working age contribute directly to GDP;14
• the labour force participation rate, that is, the labour force divided by the working age population, as only persons in the labour force directly produce output; and

• the unemployment rate, defined as the unemployed divided by the labour force, as only employed persons contribute directly to GDP. 15

The Decomposition of GDP Per Capita Growth in Canada

The levels and rates of growth of the five determinants of living standards in Canada over the 1946-2001 period are provided in Table 6. 16 Table 7 provides a decomposition of real GDP per capita in Canada over the 1946-2001 period and selected sub-periods into the five determinants.

The most important finding that emerges from these two tables is the importance of productivity growth, defined as total economy output per hour growth, for the growth of living standards in Canada. Over the 1946-2001 period, productivity growth accounted for 117.2 per cent of real GDP per capita growth in Canada. 17 The other four components of real GDP per capita growth were much less important. Declining average hours reduced real GDP per capita growth by 35.7 per cent over the period, while rising unemployment decreased it 3.4 per cent. In contrast, a more favourable demographic structure, defined as a higher proportion of persons of working age in the total population, contributed 8.1 per cent to overall per capita GDP growth, while increased labour force participation contributed 14.5 per cent.

The relative contribution of the five determinants of growth in living standards varied greatly in the different sub-periods within the 1946-2001 period. In the 1946-73 period, output per hour growth fueled living standards growth, accounting for 146.0 per cent of real GDP per capita growth. Falling average hours offset much of this productivity growth, making a contribution of -50.2 per cent to real GDP growth.

After 1973, productivity growth became less important, in both absolute terms and relative terms (75.6 per cent versus 146.0 per cent), as a driver of living standards growth for three main reasons. First, productivity growth was considerably slower in the post-1973 period, falling from an average annual rate of advance of 3.9 per cent in 1946-73 to 1.3 per cent in 1973-2001 (Chart 2 and Table 14). Second, the pace of the decline in average hours in the pre-1973 period (1.4 per cent per year) was not sustainable so this component made a much smaller negative contribution to real GDP per capita growth (-14.2 per cent). Third, with the entry of the baby boom cohorts into the labour force in the 1970s, the size of the working age population relative to the total population rose and contributed significantly to growth in living standards, particularly in the 1973-81 period (39.7 per cent). A final less important reason is that labour force participation rate growth picked up slightly after 1973, particularly in the 1973-81 period, and made a larger contribution to real GDP growth (43.5 per cent).
Because of the very low real GDP per capita growth in the first half of the 1990s, the percentage or relative contributions of the different determinants of GDP become problematic for the 1990s. An examination of the absolute contributions of the five components is more useful. Output per hour growth contributed 1.54 points to real GDP per capita growth of 1.40 per cent over the 1989-2001 period. This contribution was nearly the same in the first half of the decade (1.51 points in 1989-95) as in the second half (1.58 points in 1995-2001), even though average annual real GDP per capita picked up from 0.24 per cent in 1989-95 to 2.57 per cent in 1995-2001.

Unlike productivity trends, the absolute contributions of the other four determinants of GDP differed considerably between the first and second half of the decades, reflecting macroeconomic conditions. In the first half of the 1990s, average hours fell 0.51 per cent per year, the participation rate declined 0.58 per cent, and the unemployment rate variable, defined as one minus the unemployment rate, fell 0.34 per cent, and the relative size of the working population only increased 0.18 per cent. The first three of these developments reduced real GDP per capita growth and account for the gap between productivity and living standards growth.

In the second half of the 1990s, despite the constancy of productivity growth, real GDP per capita growth accelerated 2.3 points from 0.24 per cent in 1989-95 to 2.57 per cent because of favourable developments in all four other determinants of living standards. The developments were conditioned by the turnaround in the macroeconomic environment. Average hours fell only 0.10 per cent per year, down from 0.51 per cent in the first half of the decade. The growth in the relative size of the working age population picked up to 0.38 per cent per year. The aggregate participation rate increased 0.28 per cent per year, a turnaround of 0.86 points from the first half of the 1990s. The decline in the unemployment rate added 0.41 per cent per year to real GDP growth, also a major turnaround (0.75 points) from the first half of the decade.

Decomposition of the Canada-US Income Gap in 2001

In 2001, GDP per capita, expressed in current US dollars, in Canada was 84.7 per cent of that in the United States, making an income gap of 15.3 percentage points. Table 8 decomposes this gap into the five determinants outlined above. It is important to note that the labour market variables in the table have been adjusted to be consistent with the US definition of the working age population as 16 and over, not 15 and over. Consequently, the estimates for the labour market variables for Canada for 2001 in this table differ somewhat from those in Table 6.

Of the five variables that determine GDP per capita, in 2001 three had higher values in the United States and two in Canada. By far the most important was productivity, expressed as total economy output per hour, which in Canada was only 82.1 per cent of the US level, a 17.9 percentage point gap. This variable alone more than explained all the income gap (117.3 per cent).
The unemployment rate was higher in Canada than in the United States in 2001 (6.9 per cent versus 4.7 per cent) and this 2.2 percentage point unemployment rate gap accounted for 14.5 per cent of the aggregate income gap. Canada’s lower aggregate participation rate of 0.7 percentage points (66.2 per cent versus 66.9 per cent in the United States) also accounted for 6.9 per cent of the aggregate income gap. Finally, the slightly higher average number of hours worked per week by Canadians (34.4 versus 34.2 in the United States) offsets 0.54 points or 3.5 per cent of the 15.3 point aggregate income gap.

Canada has a demographic structure that favours a higher level of GDP per capita relative to the US level because of the larger relative size of the working age population in this country. In 2001, the working age population accounted for 77.9 per cent of the total population in Canada compared to 74.1 per cent in the United States, due to the lower fertility rate in Canada. This difference offset 5.1 points or 33.3 per cent of the Canada-US income gap, a very large contribution.

Table 9, from van Ark (2002), provides a reconciliation of labour productivity with living standards (GDP per capita) for OECD countries in 2001, including Canada and the United States. This reconciliation is similar to the decomposition undertaken in Table 8. The table provides much insight into the relationship between productivity and living standards across OECD countries relative to the United States.

According to the van Ark data, in 2001, Canada had 77.3 per cent of the US level of real GDP per capita, but its level of output per hour was 82.6 per cent of the US level. This 5.3 percentage point difference was accounted for by the factors discussed above, namely differences in average hours worked, demographic structures, labour force participation, and the unemployment rate. Average hours worked were 3.5 per cent lower in Canada than in the United States, thus lowering relative GDP per capita compared to output per worker. The higher unemployment rate in Canada reduced GDP per capita 2.1 points, while the lower labour force participation rate accounted for a further 1.2 points of the difference. On the other side of the ledger, the larger size of the working age population, defined as 15 to 64, in Canada relative to the United States raised relative GDP per capita in Canada 1.5 points compared to relative output per hour.

Decomposition of GDP Per Capita into its Components in OECD Countries in 2001

The difference between the level of living standards and productivity in Canada relative to the United States is small compared to that in many other OECD countries. Indeed, in a number of countries fewer annual hours worked and lower labour force participation rates mean that productivity, relative to the United States, is much higher than GDP per capita (Table 9). Indeed, four countries in 2001 had higher levels of output per hour worked than the United States—Belgium (113.3 per cent of the US level), Norway (110.6 per cent), France (102.6 per cent), and the Netherlands (101.8 per cent). Yet the United States had by far the highest level of GDP per capita, with Norway a distant second at 84.0 per cent of the US level.
Why do countries with higher labour productivity levels than the United States have lower levels of living standards as measured by levels of real GDP per capita? In the case of the Netherlands, Norway, and France, it is largely explained by the lower level of average annual hours worked. Workers in these countries, and in most other European countries, enjoy much more leisure time than American workers. In the case of Belgium, lower labour force participation is also an important factor.

The much greater leisure time enjoyed by Europeans is of course not incorporated into GDP per capita figures. Yet a strong case could be made that this leisure contributes to a broad definition of living standards. Indeed, it is unclear whether Europeans are worse off in terms of economic well-being than Americans despite their lower GDP per capita, particularly to the extent that Europeans have made a conscious choice to work fewer hours. Instead of using their very high productivity levels to achieve levels of material standards of living comparable to those in the United States, citizens in Belgium, Norway, France and the Netherlands appear to have adopted more moderate standards of living, measured in terms of per capita GDP, and taken part of the productivity gains in terms of fewer annual hours of work. This situation has great relevance to the objectives Canadians set for themselves.

**Targets for Canadian Living Standards**

**What is Needed to Exceed US Living Standards**

As noted in the introduction, Charles Baillie in 2001 proposed that Canadians adopt the objective of exceeding US living standards in 15 years, that is by 2016. This is an extremely ambitious but by no means impossible objective. With Canada’s GDP per capita at 84.7 per cent of the US level in 2001, real GDP per capita growth would have to be 1.0 percentage points faster per year in Canada than in the United States to eliminate this 15.3 percentage point income gap by 2016. There has been no period in postwar Canadian economic history when real GDP per capita growth has exceed that of the United States by such a magnitude for such a long period.

But other countries have achieved such a catch-up. The best recent example is Ireland. As Table 4 shows, Ireland’s GDP per capita rose from 49.9 per cent of the US level in 1989 to 82.1 per cent in 2001, an increase of 32.2 percentage points in 12 short years or 2.7 per cent per year. The small size of the Irish economy may mean the relevance of the Irish experience to Canada is limited.

The actual growth rate in real GDP per capita that Canada would have to achieve to exceed US GDP per capita growth by 1.0 percentage points for 15 years depends of course on the rate of growth that the United States achieves over this period. The United States registered average annual real GDP per capita growth of 1.82 per cent over the 1973-2001 period, 1.60 per cent over the 1989-2001 period, and 2.18 per cent in the 1995-2001 period when productivity growth accelerated. Barring a major recession, it is likely that GDP per capita growth in the United States over the next 15 years will average...
a least 2 per cent per year. This means that real GDP growth in Canada must average at least 3.0 per cent per year to achieve parity in living standards with the United States.

As noted earlier, nothing is impossible. Indeed, over the 1946-2001 period there were 25 years (out of 55) when real GDP per capita growth in Canada equaled or exceeded 3.0 per cent (Table 10). Many of these years were years of recovery and hence the robust GDP per capita growth was not sustainable. The 15-year period that experienced the strongest real GDP per capita growth in the postwar period was from 1961 to 1976. The 3.6 per cent average annual rate of growth during this period exceeds the 3.0 per cent annual growth rate in real GDP per capita needed for Canada to overtake US living standards by 2016, assuming US GDP per capita annual growth of 2.0 per cent.

Given the uncertainty about US real GDP per capita growth, it is more appropriate to frame scenarios for the attainment of US living standards in terms of the differential annual income growth rate needed (1.0 percentage points) rather than in terms of any absolute growth rate. Very strong real GDP per capita growth in Canada will not lead to the overtaking of US living standards if the United States also experiences strong growth, as is likely.

Over the 1946-2001 period, there were 17 years (out of 55) when the difference between Canadian and US real GDP per capita growth rates equaled or exceeded 1.0 per cent (Table 10). Many of these years were years of stronger recovery in Canada and hence the large differential was not sustainable. The 15-year period that experienced the largest Canada-US differential in real GDP per capita growth in the postwar period was from 1966 to 1981. However, the differential was only 0.9 percentage points, less than the 1.0 point needed for Canada to overtake US living standards by 2016.

**Strategies for Overtaking US Living Standards**

What would be needed to achieve a 1.0 per cent faster average annual growth rate in real GDP per capita in Canada than in the United States over the 2001-2016 period to eliminate the 15.3 percentage point gap in GDP per capita? Let us examine the determinants of living standards growth one by one.

The first way to close the income gap is to lower the unemployment rate. The official Canadian unemployment rate in 2001 averaged 6.9 per cent compared to the US official rate of 4.7 per cent (Table 8). About 0.8 percentage points of the gap was accounted for by definitional differences, leaving a true gap of 1.4 points. The elimination of this gap would thus reduce the GDP per capita gap by only 1.4 points, about 9 per cent of the overall gap. While this is certainly a worthwhile objective, it is no solution to the closing of the income gap.

In theory, Canada could attempt to achieve an unemployment rate below that of the United States, as it did for several years in the 1960s. Such an achievement would certainly contribute more to the closing of the income gap than the attainment of
unemployment rate parity with the United States. But with the more generous social safety in this country, the non-accelerating inflation unemployment rate (NAIRU) in Canada may be above that in the United States, making the achievement of a lower unemployment rate problematic.

A second way to close the income gap is to raise the labour force participation rate in this country to the US level. In 2001, the aggregate labour force participation rate in Canada was 66.2 per cent compared to 66.9 per cent in the United States. The elimination of this 0.7 percentage point gap would thus reduce the GDP per capita gap by only 1.1 points, about 6 per cent of the overall gap. While this may be again a worthwhile objective if the economic well-being of those who join the labour force is increased by this decision to participate, it is no solution to the closing of the income gap.

In theory, Canada could target a labour force participation rate above that of the United States, although Canada has never had higher labour force participation (countries such as Sweden have). Such a development would contribute more to the closing of the income gap than the mere attainment of parity with the United States. This again may be a worthy objective, but it is very difficult to achieve as the impact of policy on labour force participation is problematic. The aggregate participation rate is expected to fall in the next 15 years through a composition effect in both countries as the baby boom generation reaches retirement age. One way for the Canadian participation rate to exceed the US participation rate would be to develop policies to entice a larger proportion of the baby boom generation to voluntarily remain in the labour force, even if on a part-time basis.

A third way for Canada to close the income gap with the United States is for Canadians to work longer hours and thereby produce more output. However, the data sources used in this paper suggest that Canadians already work longer hours than their American counterparts, although other sources such as the US Current Population Survey do not show this. According to the Labour Force Survey, persons employed in Canada in 2001, including the part-time workers, toiled an average of 1788 hours (34.39 times 52 weeks), compared to 1778 hours (34.20 times 52 weeks) for American workers based on the establishment-based Current Employment Statistics survey. Nonetheless, it would still be possible for Canadians to work longer hours if they so choose and thereby close part of the income gap.

The main problem with this strategy is that most Canadians do not want to work longer hours. While their income would rise, they would consider themselves worse off if forced to work more. From this perspective, longer working time does not represent a solution to the income gap, except in the case of part-time workers seeking full-time work or more hours and full-time workers desiring to work additional overtime hours or longer uncompensated hours on a sustained basis.

A fourth possible mechanism to reduce the income gap is to increase the size of the working age population in the total population relative to that in the United States. In Canada in 2001, the population 16 and over represented 77.9 per cent of the total population, the highest proportion in Canada’s history and 3.8 points higher than the US
proportion of 74.1 per cent. Canada’s lower fertility rate accounts for this difference in demographic structure with the United States. This situation in 2001 reduced the Canada-US income gap 5.1 points or 33.3 per cent. With the expected continuation of lower fertility in Canada, the gap between the relative size of the working age populations in the two countries will likely increase in the future, contributing to the closing of the income gap.

The fifth and final way to reduce the Canada-US income gap is by reducing the productivity gap. This is by far the most important strategy to pursue. In 2001, total economy output per hour in Canada was 82.1 per cent of the US level, down from 84.8 per cent in 1995 and a peak of 90.8 per cent in 1977 (Table 11). Indeed, the growth of the Canada-US GDP per capita gap in the 1980s and 1990s was largely accounted for by the rising productivity gap (see Chart 3).

The elimination of the 17.9 percentage point productivity gap registered in 2001 by 2016 would be more than sufficient to close the income gap. Such a closing would imply that total economy real output per hour would have to grow 1.2 per cent faster in Canada than in the United States over the 2001-2016 period. There have in fact been 15-year periods in postwar Canadian economic history when output per hour growth has exceeded that of the United States by such a magnitude.

Other countries have achieved even more impressive catch-ups. The best recent example is Ireland. As Table 12 shows, Ireland’s GDP per hour rose from 44.3 per cent of the US level in 1973 to 71.7 per cent in 1989, an increase of 27.4 percentage points in 16 years. This productivity growth rate at 4.4 per cent per year was 3.1 per cent per year faster than experienced in the United States (Table 13).

The actual output per hour growth rate that Canada would have to achieve to exceed US GDP per hour growth by 1.2 percentage points for 15 years depends on the rate of productivity growth that the United States achieves over this period. The United States registered total economy output per hour growth of 1.50 per cent over the 1973-2001 period, 1.73 per cent over the 1989-2001 period, and 2.20 per cent in the 1995-2001 period when productivity growth accelerated (Chart 2 and Table 14).

Barring a major recession, it is likely that productivity growth in the United States over the next 15 years will average at least 2 per cent per year. Indeed, many economists are forecasting much stronger productivity growth. For example, Martin Baily (2002), former Chair of the US Council of Economic Advisors, is projecting annual productivity growth in the range of 2.2-2.7 per cent for the remaining years of this decade because of the continuing impact on productivity from information technologies.

This means that productivity growth in Canada must average at least 3.2 per cent per year, and likely more, for Canada to achieve parity in productivity levels and living standards with the United States by 2016. Over the 1946-2001 period, there were in fact 20 years (out of 55) when total economy real output per hour growth in Canada equaled or exceeded 3.2 per cent, although only one of them was after 1976. The strongest average annual growth rate in output per hour over any 15-year period in the postwar era
was an amazing 4.6 per cent per year recorded from 1949 to 1964 (Table 10). This suggests that achieving a 3.2 per cent productivity growth over the next 15 years might not be mission impossible. But the past may not always be an accurate guide to future potential.

Again, given the uncertainty about US productivity growth, it is more appropriate to frame scenarios for the elimination of the Canada-US productivity gap in terms of the differential annual productivity growth rate needed (1.1 percentage points) rather than in terms of any absolute growth rate. Very strong productivity growth in Canada will not lead to the overtaking of US productivity levels if the United States also experiences strong growth, as is likely.

Over the 1946-2001 period there were 17 years (out of 55) when the difference between Canadian and US real output per hour growth rates equaled or exceeded 1.1 per cent, but with only one year since 1976 (Table 10). Many of these years were years of a strong cyclical productivity recovery in Canada and hence the large differential was not sustainable. The 15-year period that experienced the largest Canada-US differential in real GDP per hour worked in the postwar period was from 1946 to 1961. The differential was a very impressive 1.9 percentage points, based on 4.3 per cent average annual output per hour growth in Canada and 2.4 per cent in the United States. Of course, Canada’s relative productivity level in 1946 was lower than in 2001 (55.3 per cent of the US level versus 82.1 per cent), suggesting that catch-up possibilities were greater then.

To the degree that the Canada-US productivity gap reflects lags in the introduction of US best practice technologies into Canadian industry, there may be potential to close a significant part, if not all, of the productivity gap in the long run. This is particularly so if the pace of technological progress in the United States falls off in the future.

One school of thought on technological change suggests that technological innovation comes in spurts or waves and that the United States is currently experiencing such a wave. When this phase of technical progress comes to an end, according to this view, productivity growth will decelerate in the United States. Other countries will then have an opportunity to catch-up to US productivity levels. This convergence phenomenon was experienced by many countries in the postwar period. But as we do not know when the productivity impacts of the IT revolution in the United States will fall off, we can say little about the possible implications of this phenomenon for the evolution of the Canada-US productivity gap, at least for the next 15 years.

From a long-term perspective, the widening of the Canada-US productivity and income gaps may not be as unfavourable a development as it is commonly portrayed, particularly in certain media. To the degree that this growing gap is driven by an acceleration in productivity growth in the United States and to the degree than Canada is able to eventually adopt these US best practice technologies, Canadians will be materially better off in the long run from this faster pace of technical progress.
Thus the only politically acceptable and effective strategy that can significantly contribute to the closing of the Canada-US income gap is to greatly reduce or eliminate the productivity gap. There are many specific public policies and private sector actions that can contribute to the attainment of this objective. These will be discussed in the other papers prepared for the TD Forum on Living Standards.

Indeed, a case can be made that closing the productivity gap should in fact be a more important national objective than closing the income gap. This is because closing the productivity gap would give Canadians the possibility of trading off income for more leisure, an option many European countries have already chosen. The elimination of the 17.9 percentage point productivity gap with the United States would allow Canadians to choose between a 17.9 per cent increase in real income relative to the United States, or to work 17.9 per cent less, or some combination of these outcomes. If Canadians chose more leisure time and consequently did not close the narrowly defined gap with the United States in living standards, it would be incorrect to conclude that Canadians were worse off in terms of economic well-being or living standards, broadly defined than Americans. Productivity allows choices.

Conclusion

The key conclusions of the paper are twofold. First, a focus on improving Canada’s productivity growth performance, and in particular eliminating the Canada-US productivity gap, is by far the most important and effective way to attain the objective of Canadian living standards exceeding US living standards by 2016. Second, an objective for Canada of matching or exceeding the US productivity level is probably a better societal objective than equaling or exceeding US living standards, as measured by GDP per capita. Attaining this objective would certainly give Canadians the opportunity to have the same level of income as Americans, but it would also give them the option of choosing more leisure time, a component of economic well-being that is currently not incorporated into GDP.

References


Statistics Canada (2002a) “Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures, United


Endnotes

1 An abridged version of this paper was published in the Fall 2002 issue of the International Productivity Monitor and is posted at www.csls.ca under the Monitor.

2 For example, Claire Brown (1994) in American Standards of Living develops an index of living standards based on three functional categories of expenditures: basic, variety, and status, with each category representing the use of expenditures to accomplish a different goal.

3 Estimates of the Index of Economic Well-being (IEWB) have been developed for Canada and the provinces, the United States, and OECD countries and are posted at www.csls.ca. In general, this Index has grown at a slower rate than per capita income. For discussion of the IEWB, see Osberg (1985) and Osberg and Sharpe (1998, 2002a, 2002b).

4 Statistics Canada recommends that current price income estimates be used for international comparisons of income levels over constant price estimates because the former take account of shifts in the components of GDP, unlike constant price GDP estimates. This means that PPPs for each year are applied to the domestic currency (Canadian dollar) current price series to convert the series into a common currency series. The PPP of a base year is not used, as is the case for converting a domestic currency constant price series into a common currency. This paper follows this recommendation for comparisons of Canada-US income levels. There is little difference between estimates of Canada/US relative income levels based on current and constant prices (Table 3A and Charts 4-6). Growth rate comparisons across countries are of course based on trends in constant price GDP estimates expressed in domestic currency and do not require conversion into a common currency by purchasing power parities.

5 The revision of the US national accounts on July 31, 2002 lowered US GDP estimates for the 1999-2001 period and hence reduced Canada-US income gap. In the original July 16 version of this paper, Canada’s GDP per capita in 2001 was 83.7 per cent of that in the United States. The revisions increased it 1.0 percentage points to 84.7 per cent, lowering that gap from 16.3 points to 15.3 points. Appendix Table 10 provides details on the revisions.

6 In 2001, PI was equal to 79.9 per cent of GDP in Canada, compared to 85.1 per cent in the United States. The PI/GDP ratio moves inversely to the proportion of corporate profits in GDP since corporate profits are a component of GDP but not of PI (see Appendix Chart 1). Corporate profits have shrunk in relation to GDP in the United States since the mid 1990s while the opposite has been true in Canada, with the result that the gap in the PI/GDP ratios of Canada and the United States has grown rapidly since then, from 0.9 percentage points in 1995 to 5.2 points in 2001. Corporate profits have been a major determinant of the gap between the Canada and US PI/GDP ratios since at least the mid 1970s; the historically greater
importance in Canada of natural resources-based economic rents, which are included in GDP but not in PI, may account for the lower PI/GDP ratio in Canada in earlier decades.

7 A country that consumes a higher proportion of output and hence has higher PI per capita may have a higher living standard, as proxied by PI per capita, in the short run than a country with higher GDP per capita, but lower PI per capita because it reinvests a larger proportion of GDP. In the long run, the country with the higher GDP per capita will be better able to sustain high levels of living standards.

8 Maddison (2001) provides estimates of real GDP and population estimates for Canada and the United States that allow calculation of Canada’s GDP per capita as a proportion of the US level in 1820 (71.0 per cent), 1870 (69.3 per cent), 1913 (83.9 per cent), and for all years from 1950 (77.8 per cent) to 1998 (75.2 per cent). These estimates are not comparable with the estimates for the 1946-2001 period in this paper because of the use of different data sources.

9 PI per capita and PDI per capita also peaked as a proportion of that in the United States in 1981, at 93.5 per cent and 88.7 per cent respectively.

10 In contrast to GDP per capita, relative PI per capita and PDI per capita continued to decline over the 1992-97 period, the former from 85.4 per cent to 79.7 per cent of the US level and the latter from 75.4 per cent to 70.8 per cent.

11 Again, in contrast to the improvement in GDP per capita relative to the United States, PI and PDI per capita have declined slightly over the 1997-2001 period (from 79.7 per cent of the US level in 1997 to 78.6 per cent in 2001 for PI and from 70.8 per cent in 1997 to 70.4 per cent in 2001 for PDI).

12 The increase was 14.5 percentage points for PI per capita (from 64.1 per cent of the US level in 1946 to 78.6 per cent in 2001), but only 5.4 points for PDI from 65.0 per cent to 70.4 per cent.

13 West Germany was replaced by Unified Germany in the sample after 1995. If West Germany had still been included as a separate country, Canada would likely have ranked seventh.

14 The working age population is defined as the population 15 and over in Canada and 16 and over in the United States. In OECD statistics, the working age population is generally defined as those aged 15 to 64.

15 The labour force participation rate and the unemployment rate can be combined to form the employment rate (employed persons divided by the working age population).

16 The data upon which Table 6 is based are found in Appendix Table 1.

17 Appendix Tables 2-4 show that the same conclusion regarding the importance of productivity growth also applies to the United States.

18 The US output per hour level estimated is based on average weekly hours data from the establishment-based Current Employment Statistics (CES) survey. In 2001, this estimate was 34.2 hours per week (Table 14). The CES survey excludes employees on farms, proprietors (unincorporated self-employed workers), and unpaid family workers. Hours data are not collected by the CES for non-production workers in the goods-producing industries and for supervisory workers in service-producing industries. For non-manufacturing industries, it is assumed that the hours of non-production and supervisory workers move at the same rate and have the same level as production and nonsupervisory workers. An alternative source of US data on hours is the Current Population Survey (CPS), a household survey which covers all civilian workers. This survey collects data from all workers on actual hours worked so does not require adjustments for incomplete coverage and hours assumptions for non-production and supervisory workers. According to the CPS, average weekly hours in 2001 were 39.2, 5.0 hours or 14.6 per cent greater than the CES estimate (Appendix Table 8). The productivity implications of the alternative hours series are very significant, with the level of output per hour in the United States in 2001 14.6 per cent lower with the CES estimate. This means that Canada’s output per hour in 2001 would be 94.1 per cent of that of the United States (Appendix Table 7), instead of the 82.1 per cent reported in Table 11. As the rate of growth in the two hours series was very close over the 1995-2001 period, the increase in the Canada-US productivity gap between 1995 and 2001 is not affected. However, there is a decrease in the Canada-US productivity gap over the 1981-95 when the CPS hours series is used, in contrast to a large increase when the CES hours series is used.

The BLS and the OECD (1998 and 2001) use the CES hours series because it is believed that the CPS series overestimates hours worked and that in general establishment-based hours data are superior to household-based data for productivity estimates. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Van Ark (1998) and Eldridge, Manser, Otto, and Robinson (2001). More work is badly needed in this area.
Statistics Canada (2002b) reports that in 1999 Canada’s fertility rate hit a record low of 1.58 children per woman, compared to the American rate of 2.08 per cent, a difference of more than one half a child per woman. Only 20 years ago the gap was less than one-third of that size.

One notes that van Ark’s estimate of Canada’s output per hour worked relative to the US level of 82.6 per cent in 2001 is virtually identical to the CSLS estimate in Table 8, but that van Ark’s estimate of real GDP per capita of 77.3 per cent is well below the CSLS estimate of 84.7 per cent. This latter discrepancy reflects the use of different data sources and definitions, including the use by the CSLS of more recent (and higher) population estimates for the United States, different sources for hours data, and different definitions of the working age population.

It is intriguing in Table 9 to note that GDP per capita and output per hour were virtually the same in Australia as in Canada, as were the effects of working time, demographic structures, labour force participation, and unemployment on GDP per capita.

Just as certain countries have enjoyed periods of rapid catch-up, other countries have experienced periods of significant deterioration in their relative standard of living. For example, New Zealand’s relative GDP per capita plummeted 27.6 percentage points from 88.8 per cent of the US level in 1950 to 61.2 per cent in 1989 while that of Switzerland fell 33.8 points from 115.7 per cent in 1973 to 81.9 per cent in 2001 (see Table 4).

For discussion of the Irish economic miracle and lessons for Canada, see Fortin (2001).

Appendix Table 5 provides data on the official unemployment rate in Canada and the United States in 2001 by detailed age and sex groups. All groups have higher unemployment rates in Canada than the United States.

The major difference in the compilation of the unemployment rates in Canada and the United States lies in the treatment of passive job searchers, defined at those whose only job search method is reading newspaper want ads. These passive job searchers are included in the labour force in Canada, but are excluded in the United States. According to Sunter (1998), this difference in 1998 accounted for 0.7 points of the gap.

The Canadian rate is defined in relation to the 15 and over population, the US rate in relation to the 16 and over population. As the participation rate of 15 year olds is low, the Canadian participation rate has a slight downward bias compared to the US rate.

Appendix Table 6 provides data on the labour force participation rates by detailed age/sex groups for Canada and the United States in 2001. The lion’s share of the differential is accounted for by the higher participation rate of men and persons 55 and over in the United States.

The gradual raising of the retirement age for entitlement to full social security benefits in the United States from 65 to 67 and the absence of such a policy for the Canada/Quebec Pension Plans in Canada means that the participation rate for the 65 and over age group will likely be increasingly higher in the United States.

As noted in note 17, there are different hours estimates for the United States. Appendix Table 9 shows that annual hours estimates made by the OECD, the Groningen Growth and Development Centre/Conference Board, and ILO’s Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) are somewhat higher than the CES estimates. The CPS estimates are of course much higher.

From 1946 to 1977, Canada’s aggregate level of output per hour had converged toward the higher US level, rising from 55.3 per cent to 90.8 per cent of the US level.


See Rao and Sharpe (2002) for a recent collection of papers that discuss many policies to improve Canada’s productivity performance. See Sharpe (2002b) for an overview of productivity concepts, trends and issues in Canada.